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ABSTRACT 
Every crisis presents opportunities. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 provides a valuable 
opportunity to study the corporate governance and regulatory aspects of the banking 
sector, a hinge point in the development of corporate governance in banks. There is a 
tremendous amount of academic literature on corporate governance of corporations 
generally, but not of banks. Banks share many characteristics in common with other 
corporations but differ in respect of the social costs involved. Banks play a fundamental role 
in a country’s economy and problems within the banking sector will have an impact on the 
wider community. The author argues that corporate governance played an important 
contributing factor to the financial crisis. In particular, the financial crisis has highlighted 
multiple principal-agent problems within the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of banking. 
Multiple principal-agent problems are the direct consequence of financial innovation and 
regulatory dialectic. The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model relies on securitisation. Academic 
literature has revealed that securitisation is opaque and complex (Buiter, 2007; Berndt and 
Gupta, 2008; Fender and Mitchell 2009a). Little research however, has been conducted into 
why securitisation is opaque and complex from a principal-agent angle. This paper thus 
provides a new perspective to the literature on principal-agent theory and banking 
corporate governance. 
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1. Financial Innovation 
Financial innovation and the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
On 7th February 2007, HSBC announced losses linked to US subprime mortgages. Two 
months later on 3rd April 2007, New Century Financial, which specialised in sub-prime 
mortgages, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and cut half of its workforce. The 
sub-prime mortgage crisis had begun. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States in 
September 2007 is arguably the catalyst to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. During 
this period, the world’s financial system has experienced severe challenges since the Second 
World War. When borrowers of sub-prime mortgages failed to repay their loans, US banks 
faced a liquidity crisis. Securitisation of loans, increased leverage and the development of 
complex financial products all contributed to the liquidity problem. Globalisation meant that 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected most advanced countries simultaneously. 
Globalisation acts as a rapid multiplier effect, transmitting the infection instantly across the 
globe and reveals the fragility of the world’s inter-connected financial market. In the UK, the 
property market was shaken due to the securitised credit model and liquidity strains. UK 
banks were exposed when market confidence and asset prices fell. Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley were nationalised. The government’s recapitalisation programme of 
£850 billion and quantitative easing programme of £200 billion rescued banks such as the 
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Lloyds Banking Group (Lloyds and HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (NAO, 2009). UK 
taxpayers now own 43% of Lloyds Banking Group and 84% of Royal Bank of Scotland (UKFI, 
2009). 
Sub-prime mortgages form a component part of securitised assets. Securitisation is the 
‘process of converting cash flows arising from underlying assets or debts (receivables) due to 
the originator (the entity which created the receivables) into a smoothed repayment stream, 
thus enabling the originator to raise asset-backed finance through a loan or an issue of debt 
securities - generically known as asset-backed securities or ABS - which is limited recourse in 
nature to the credit of the receivables rather than that of the originator as a whole, and with 
the finance being self-liquidating in nature’ (Deacon, 2004 cited in Burns, 2009). Two schools 
of thought on securitisation have since emerged. According to the first school, securitisation 
is to be celebrated because it reduces default risk by dispersing risks along the process and 
thus strengthens the financial system (Greenlaw et al (2008) cited in Shin, 2009). However, 
Acharya, Philippon and Richardson (2009) rebut this argument and counterclaim that the 
securitisation market collapsed in early 2007 due to banks ignoring their own model of 
securitisation and failed to transfer credit risks (Acharya, Philippon and Richardson, (2009). 
Banks moved from the ‘originate-to-hold’ model to ‘originate-to-distribute’ model because 
in theory, securitisation would give greater liquidity; more borrowing capacity and ability to 
transfer credit risks to ultimate investors. In reality, the latter was not achieved (Acharya, 
Philippon and Richardson, 2009; Goodhart, 2009). Acharya, Philippon and Richardson (2009) 
believe that between 2003-2007, banks utilised securitisation to avoid Basel II Accord on 
capital requirements. Regulatory dialectic thus became the aim of banks, not transferring 
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credit risks to investors. The term ‘originate-to-pretend-to-distribute’ model should be more 
accurate to describe securitisation (Goodhart, 2009).  
The second school of thought on securitisation is one of misalignment of incentives 
(Paligorova, 2009) Securitisation contributed to the collapse of the financial system because 
incentives were distorted in all the stages of the securitisation process. The end result is that 
the ultimate investors at the end of the process will end up with the ‘hot potato of bad 
loans’ (Shin, 2009). In Shin’s view, the ultimate investors did not end up with the bad loans. 
He argues that the financial crisis was severe because the bad loans were not all passed on 
to final investors. Instead, the bad loans remained in the securitisation process, on the 
balance sheet of financial intermediaries or special purpose vehicles that sponsored them 
(Shin, 2009). Misalignment of incentives is the fundamental ground of the principal-agent 
problem and it is important to study the multiple principal-agent problem in the  
securitisation process. 
It is vital to fix the securitisation process because loan securitisation is the main source for 
producing credit (Pozen, 2009). Pozen states that in the United States, banks accounted for 
less than 25% of all credit extended. Lenders in the shadow banking industry (insurance 
companies, hedge funds, credit card companies) provided the majority of loans. These 
lenders relied heavily on loan securitisation. A similar pattern can be found in the UK, but to 
a lesser extent (Bank of England, 2009). Nevertheless, heavy reliance on securitisation by UK 
banks is a contributory factor to the downfall of banks such as Northern Rock. Northern 
Rock had a very unusual business model. It combined a traditional reliance on illiquid long-
term mortgage assets with a reliance on innovative sources such as securitisation and the 
wholesale market (Milne & Wood, 2009). Mortgages constituted 77% of Northern Rock’s 
5 
 
assets. At the end of 2006, Northern Rock issued asset-backed securities through its 
‘Granite’ securitisation vehicles and obtained 40% of funding (Milne & Wood, 2009). 
Wholesale funding constituted 68% of Northern Rock’s liabilities whilst deposits only made 
up 27% of its liabilities (Goldsmith-Pinkham & Yorulmazer, 2009). Northern Rock 
experienced a bank run in September 2007 which caused a ripple effect in the UK financial 
sector. The Bank of England assisted by giving emergency financial aid and later 
nationalising Northern Rock. Hence, it is important to understand the problems in 
securitisation and its associated issues. 
The rest of the paper will consist of the following sections: section 2 of the paper will be a 
discussion on the theory of the principal-agent problem. Section 3 consists of an analysis of 
the multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation. Section 4 consists of a discussion on 
the associated issues (information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection…etc.) 
created by the multiple principal-agent problems. Finally, section 5 is a concluding remark. 
 
2. The theory of the principal-agent problem 
Securitisation exacerbates agency conflicts (Gan and Mayer, 2006). Agency conflicts exist 
when there is a separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932). 68 years ago, 
Berle and Means published their seminal work ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’. Their work is arguably the birth of contemporary corporate governance thought 
and still exerts significant influence on modern corporations in the 21st century. As Berle and 
Means pointed out in 1932, the distinctive feature of the modern public corporation is the 
separation of ownership and control. This means that modern public corporations are 
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subject to the principal-agent problem as identified by Jensen & Meckling. In modern 
corporations, the managers decide how a corporation’s capital is spent, how resources are 
allocated and what endeavours the corporation undertakes. They do not however, own the 
capital or resources. Those in control of the corporation, “and therefore in a position to 
secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, entitled to the bulk 
of such profits… The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old 
assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective 
use.” Berle and Means believed this led to one simple conclusion: “[W]here the bulk of the 
profits of enterprise are scheduled to go to owners who are individuals other than those in 
control, the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance with those of 
ownership and…the controlling group is in a position to serve its own interests.” 
 
Thus, the main tenet of Berle and Means’s theory is that capital in the U.S. has become 
heavily concentrated during the previous few decades. Certain corporations became very 
powerful. As these corporations grew, it became increasingly difficult for the original owners 
to maintain their majority shareholdings and shares became dispersed amongst many small 
shareholders. The consequence of this dispersal, as Berle and Means suggested, was that 
power became vested in the managers, who run the corporations. These managers have 
different interests to shareholders.  
 
Berle and Means did not foresee the changes that technology and innovation have made to 
the banking sector.  In search of greater yield and liquidity, banks have abandoned the 
traditional ‘originate-to-hold’ model to the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Securitisation has 
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allowed banks to take on more risks and generate more profits. Ownership and 
responsibility of risks are lost in the process. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed Berle 
and Means’s concept of separation of ownership and control further. Under the principle of 
separation of ownership and control, shareholders own shares in a business whilst 
managers run a business. The principal-agent theory stems from the concern that managers 
(agents) will pursue their own interests and indulge in perks whilst bearing only a proportion 
of the costs. Imperfect information (hidden action) and misaligned incentives (hidden 
information) between principal and agent are the causes of this fear.  Shareholders 
(principals) find it difficult to monitor the managers because of time and logistical 
constraints. Monitoring the managers will incur agency costs. To limit agency costs, Jensen 
and Meckling recommended that incentives should be enhanced whilst restrictions in the 
market to be removed. In their view, the focus of the principal-agent theory is determining 
the most efficient contract to align the interests of directors with shareholders’. The firm is 
regarded as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because stakeholders have 
contracts between themselves. Once these interests are aligned through contracts, 
directors should pursue the goal of maximising shareholder value.  
Jensen and Meckling defined an agency relationship as: ‘a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.’ (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, p.5) In modern banking, the contracts of finance include both equity 
and debt. Equity holders have formal control rights over a bank’s assets and are entitled to 
residual profits. Debt holders only enjoy control rights when there is a default on the fixed 
payments. Jensen and Meckling (1976) said that both equity and debt finance create specific 
8 
 
general problems. In equity finance, the agency costs are in relation to managerial slack. In 
debt finance, the agency costs are in relation to risk shifting (asset substitution). According 
to Keller (2008), managerial slack takes place when a manager ‘fails to maximise the value of 
a bank or portfolio’. Risk shifting takes place when the manager accepts ‘an inefficient high 
level of risk in his efforts to maximise the value of a firm or portfolio’ (Keller, 2008). These 
two problems can happen at the same time. In the next section, the author will discuss the 
multiple principal-agent problems and its associated issues in securitisation. 
 
3. Multiple principal-agent problems in securitisation 
 
Modern banking has created multiple principals and agents in the principal-agent problem. 
The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model relies on securitisation and it is useful to understand the 
securitisation process and key players before the multiple principal-agent problems can be 
discussed. Diagram 1 below illustrates the key players in the securitisation process: 
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Diagram 1: Key players in the securitisation process 
Source: Adapted from Fender and Mitchell (2009a)  
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Diagram 2: Multiple principal-agent relationships and its associated problems in the 
securitisation process 
Source: Adapted from Fender and Mitchell (2009a); Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) 
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Multiple principal-agent problems 
SPVs and arrangers play the dual role of principal and agent. This highlights a number of 
problems. First, although the SPV owns and controls the securitised loans, Mishkin (2008) 
reveals that responsibility and ownership for the securitised loans were lost in the 
securitisation process. In the traditional ‘originate-to-hold’ model, senior bank managers 
would supervise junior managers in analysing and assessing default risks. The European 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee even commented that bank managers who offered 
too many risky loans would have been dismissed (ESFRC, 2007). In the ‘originate-to-
distribute’ model, the originator has little incentive, if at all, to monitor the quality of the 
securitised loan because investors as end-users bear the risks.  The job of analysing and 
monitoring risks has been assumed by credit rating agencies.  Originators were however, 
interested in the volume of the loans because of the substantial fees they received. Risks 
without ownership is a licence to moral hazard since there is no meaningful penalty for the 
risk shredder. Moral hazard refers to ‘changes in behaviour in response to redistribution of 
risk’ (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). Originators were thus free to sell loans/assets, 
obtain more liquidity and take on more leverage. However, not all risks were shifted and the 
boomerang has swung back to the risk shredders, the originators. Shin (2009) argues that 
not all the assets were sold to investors in practice. The ultimate investors often bought 
assets backed by bad loans. There is a difference between assets sold to ultimate investors 
and issuing assets backed by securities to ultimate investors. In the former, the bad loans 
are taken off the balance sheets of the originators. In the latter, bad loans remained on the 
books of SPVs and other financial intermediaries. Although SPVs are separate legal entities, 
the originators often retained some interest (Shin, 2009). Thus, this led to originators losing 
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a large amount of money. Moral hazard has thus stung the originators because they were 
saddled with excessive leverage and risks when they thought that risks have shifted to the 
ultimate investors. 
Buiter (2007) and Pozen (2009) have suggested that retention of a tranche of the 
collaterised debt obligations by the originator should be a method that would increase the 
originator’s incentive to monitor the quality of the loan. Buiter (2008, cited in House of 
Commons 2008a) suggested to the House of Commons Treasury Committee that originators 
should retain the junior tranche in the borrower’s loan so that they have an incentive to 
monitor the risks attached to it. His other suggested solution is to create transparency by 
publishing details about the owners of the equity tranche. Pozen (2009) suggested that all 
originators should retain at least 5% of the risk of loss for any loans they originate and sell to 
the secondary requirement. Other authors such as Keller (2008) and Fender and Mitchell 
(2009) are less enthusiastic about retention of equity tranches. Keller (2008) said that 
although it is not a requirement to retain an equity tranche, managers often buy or hold a 
portion of the equity tranche already as part of the financial remuneration. There is still 
little evidence of whether retention of tranches has a positive effect on the performance of 
collaterised debt obligations management. Only the market and future events can judge 
this. Fender and Mitchell (2009) are more dismissive of the effect of retaining equity 
tranches. They believe that this method does not provide strong enough incentives for 
originators to screen borrowers particularly when downturns are likely or if the retained 
tranches are too small. They suggested that disclosure of the size and nature of the equity 
retention is a better mechanism. The author believes that retention of equity tranches alone 
will not suffice. Retention of tranches is similar to executives holding shares in a bank or 
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company. Richard Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers had 10 million shares in Lehman 
Brothers but ultimately did not help when the bank collapsed (Fishman, 2008). According to 
Valencia (2010), a recent study found that banks where chief executives had many shares 
and options in the company actually performed worse than those with fewer shares. One 
possible explanation is that the chief executives took risks that they thought were in 
shareholders’ best interests. They concentrated on short-term performance and the stock 
market crash wiped off their shares. Therefore, both retention and disclosure of tranches 
are necessary to reduce the agency problem of aligning incentives. 
The second problem concerns arrangers, which are often investment banks. They should in 
theory act as agents for their clients, the investors, but as Shing (2009) suggested, they 
often acted as principals for themselves. Quarterly reporting requirements and a culture of 
sales rather than of serving the client encouraged banks to focus on short-term 
performance and taking excessive risks. An example is AIG’s huge losses from its insurance 
branch. AIG’s managers bought risky assets outright, thus acting as principals for themselves 
rather than as agents for their clients. They reinvested securities when they did not fully 
understand their exposures and assumed that the secondary market for securities was 
robust (Tucker, 2010). The managers were wrong and AIG suffered a repo run, which is 
similar to a bank run. The repo market is a ‘large, short-term market that provides financing 
for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions’ (Gorton & Metrick, 
2009).  
Better alignment of incentives can be achieved through transparency; accountability and 
better regulation of banks. President Obama’s proposal to ban deposit-taking banks from 
engaging in proprietary lending is to be welcomed because this should hopefully reduce the 
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principal-agent problem between arrangers and ultimate investors (Clark, Treanor & Owen, 
2010). Lord Myners does not think that UK banks engaged in proprietary trading as much as 
the US banks. Therefore, he is not keen to implement similar measures in the UK. Diagram 2 
suggests that securisited credit played a lesser role in the UK, but Barclays bank is one of the 
biggest holders of US bonds due to its purchase of the American operations of Lehman 
Brothers (Tett, 2010). Therefore, it is important for Barclays to provide liquidity to US banks 
when half of the American debts are due within the next few months (Tett, 2010). Banning 
proprietary trading would hinder Barclays Bank in providing such liquidity. The main 
rationale of banning proprietary trading however, is to be commended. During the financial 
crisis, many banks held onto collaterised debt obligations for long periods, thus using up 
their capital. Basle II rules allows banks to hold these collaterised debt obligations with 
almost no reserves, which made the entire financial system vulnerable to shocks. A ban on 
proprietary trading would tighten the rules on trading books, making it harder for banks to 
provide cheap credit. 
The decision of the Securities & Exchange Commission to charge Goldman Sachs and its 
employee, Fabrice Tourre, with fraud on 17th April 2010 (Seib, 2010) seems to suggest that 
the relationship between arrangers, asset managers and investors is murky and fraught with 
danger.  Goldman Sachs is alleged to have collaborated with a hedge fund called Paulson & 
Co to create a mortgage-backed product that was doomed to fail. The product is called 
Abacus (a collaterised debt obligation) and is was made up of risky and poor quality loans. 
Goldman Sachs then allegedly lied to investors ahd insurers about the types of mortgage 
that the product contained. It used a company called ACA Management to validate the CDO. 
Consequently, investors and insurers lost more than £650 million. Paulson & Co (the asset 
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manager) is not guilty of any wrong-doing. What is interesting here is the principal-agent 
problem leading to conflict of interest and fraud. Goldman Sachs (agent of investors and 
principal of asset manager, Paulson & Co) clearly did not act in the best interest of the 
investors by lying to them. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) is one of the major victims in this 
fraud. ABN Amro was one of the insurers. RBS bought ABN Amro in 2007. In 2008, RBS paid 
Goldman Sachs almost $841 million to get out of the insurance deal. It is yet unclear 
whether RBS will take legal action against Goldman Sachs. However, this case is important. 
It shows that the financial crisis is not just of mismanagement on the part of bank directors, 
but one of fraud and conflict of interest through financial innovation. The Valukas’s report 
of March 2010 reveals that Lehman Brothers used a ‘materially misleading’ accounting 
vehicle called Repo 105. Repo 105 masked the size of Lehman’s balance sheet as the 
pressure grew for investment banks to reduce their leverage at the end of 2007, which 
Lehman was also doing at the time. Goldman Sachs went further in that not only it 
participated in opaque deals and offered bad loans, it created Abacus, a complicated 
financial product which transferred wealth from Paulson & Co. at the expense of other 
investors such as RBS (Hutton, 2010). The Financial Services Authority should investigate this 
matter and co-operate with the Securities & Exchange Commission to hold those 
responsible. Conflicts of interest must be disclosed to avoid similar problems in the future. 
 
The third principal-agent problem is manifested in the different types of ultimate investors. 
As at 31 December 2008, statistics from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) show that 
institutional investors own 39.9% of shares in the UK stock market; individuals own 10.2% 
and the government owns 1.1% of the UK stock market (ONS, 2010). The rest of the share 
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ownership is as follows: rest of the world: 41.5%; other financial institutions: 0.8%; charities: 
3% and banks: 3.5%. Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley are not taken into account in 
the survey. Individual investors, often ordinary people with pensions, are the ultimate 
principals of the securitised loans through institutional investors. However, individual 
investors have little control over fund managers. Fund managers have little control over 
chief executives of banks. Chief executives could barely control traders because the former 
did not fully understand financial derivatives (Dillow, 2008). Therefore, traders were at full 
liberty to take excessive risks. They were awarded huge bonuses if they performed well but 
received little punishment for losing money. Dillow (2008) suggested that hedge funds did 
not fail in the financial crisis because of the ownership structure. Hedge funds are owned as 
private partnerships where there is no separation of ownership and control. Thus, there is 
less risk of misalignment of incentives in hedge funds. Joint and several liability of partners 
also acted as a useful deterrent to excessive risks. Dillow’s point is interesting because it 
raises the cost of separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means (1932) commented 
that: ‘In strictly capitalist countries and particularly in time of depression, demands are 
constantly put forward that the men controlling the great economic orgasnisms be made to 
accept responsibility for the well-being of those who are subject to the organisation, whether 
workers, investors or customers.’ (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 310). They proposed that the 
modern corporation should serve all stakeholders and not just  shareholders. It is for society 
to assert the stakeholder approach of corporate governance.  
Indeed, the stakeholder approach is important to UK taxpayers because they own shares in 
Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland. It is 
important that investors become more active and socially responsible to rebuild the banking 
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structure because society at large suffered the most during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Taxpayers have seen the value of their pensions decreased and they had to underwrite the 
four banks named above during the financial crisis. Peston (2009) argues that there is an 
asymmetry between the liability of banks’ shareholders whilst taxpayers have unlimited 
liability. It is this asymmetry that has led to banks taking excessive risks whilst taxpayers 
could hardly monitor bank managers’ actions. 
Individal investors in a dispersed ownership country find it difficult to exert influence. UKFI 
Limited should thus act as an active institutional investor. UKFI Limited was created as a new 
‘arm’s-length body’ to manage the government’s shares in UK banks. UKFI is wholly owned 
by the Government and has the overarching objective to ‘protect and create value for the 
taxpayer as shareholder with due regard to the maintenance of financial stability and in a 
way that promotes competition’. (House of Commons, 2008b). UKFI Limited is only a 
temporary investor in Lloyds Banking Group; Royal Bank of Scotland; Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley but it should engage fully in maximising value for taxpayers. Its website 
is thin on information, so it would assist taxpayers if UKFI Limited can provide more 
information, including its business strategy. It is also important that UKFI Limited operates 
without political influence. UKFI Limited currently shares support staff and a building with 
the Treasury (House of Commons, 2008b). Real operational independence and accountable 
capitalism will only be achieved if UKFI Limited truly operates at arm’s length.  
The concept of free taxpayer guarantees should cease and that financial reform should ‘put 
capitalism back into the heart of capitalism’ (Tucker, cited in Aldrick 2010. Banks are vital in 
capitalist economies but they run on socialist principles as they provide social benefits to 
the public. What we have seen in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 is that taxpayers, rather 
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than bankers, have borne the mistakes of the financial world. Tucker’s remark is welcomed 
because bankers should take responsibility for their own mistakes. 
 
4. Analysis of associated issues revealed by multiple principal-agent problems in 
securitisation 
The problems associated with the multiple principal-agent relationships are highlighted in 
italics in diagram 6. They include: information asymmetry; adverse selection; predatory 
lending; moral hazard; mortgage fraud; conflict of interests; managerial slack; risk shifting; 
model error; liability asymmetry; accountability and democracy deficits. Ashcraft and 
Schuermann (2008) have provided an excellent account of the associated principal-agent 
problems in seven stages. Their analysis is extended below by identification of new 
problems in securitisation, especially in the UK securitisation model where the UK 
government acts as agent to taxpayers. 
 
Tackling information asymmetry 
Berle and Means (1932) recognised that the securities market has provided mobility and 
liquidity to traders. They acknowledged that the market works well only if there is ‘an 
adequate supply of information on which to base an appraisal’ (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 
263). Parties to a contract often have unequal access to information. The seller usually has 
more information than the buyer. Hence, the doctrine of ‘caveat emptor’. Bank 
stakeholders similarly experience information asymmetry problems. Bank managers know 
more about its bank assets than depositors or other stakeholders. In securitisation, 
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information asymmetry exists in all stages because the securitisation process is a long and 
complex loan transaction. The seller often has more information than the buyer, so for 
example, the originator will have more information than the arranger; the arranger will have 
more information than the ultimate investors. The originator has more information about 
loans and may be tempted to induce the borrower to misrepresent financial details on the 
loan application (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). This can lead to predatory lending and 
adverse selection. These problems will be discussed below. 
 
Information asymmetry is not confined to the banking industry but there is evidence that it 
affects banks more than other sectors. Morgan (2002) reveals that rating agencies disagree 
much more over banks and insurance companies than with other sectors. Flannery, Kwan 
and Nimalendran (2002) do not support Morgan’s view, using stock analysts reports. 
However, Santos (2004) finds that Moodys and Standard and Poors disagreed more on the 
ratings of financial firms than non-financial firms. The difficulty with explaining these 
findings is the opaqueness of the banking sector. One of the main criticisms of the originate-
to-distribute model is that both the financial products and institutions are too opaque 
(Buiter, 2007; Berndt and Gupta, 2008; Fender and Mitchell 2009a). Complex structures and 
products meant that few understood who owned what assets or risks. The process of 
securitisation resembles a cooking recipe: it involves slicing, dicing, tranching, bundling and 
re-packaging. Bank assets are often intangible and stakeholders do not realise there is a 
problem until late in the transaction.  
 
Complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet vehicles are permissible (though 
not encouraged) under generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). However, 
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Companies Act 2006 does not define ‘off-balance sheet arrangement’, so there are no 
guidelines to companies as to the type and amount of off-balance sheet transactions they 
should disclose. As a result of this lacuna, the International Accounting Standards Board has 
proposed to tighten up the derecognition (transfer) of financial assets and liabilities. There 
would be better disclosure because financial statements will contain information about an 
entity’s risk exposure.  Montagnon (2008b) suggested to the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee that audit and risk committees within a bank should scrutinise their 
balance sheets very carefully. This is very important as this scrutiny might have prevented 
mistakes such as the misuse of off-balance sheet vehicles at The Royal Bank of Scotland. The 
Royal Bank of Scotland was severely exposed to off-balance sheet vehicles when it took over 
ABN Amro in 2007. Before the financial crisis, ABN Amro was exposed to more than $100 
billion on off-balance sheet entities. This allowed ABN Amro to expand its asset base and 
they made good profits when the economy was healthy. However, ABN Amro suffered huge 
losses when the market dipped.  In December 1999, ABN Amro set up Amstel Funding 
Corporation, an off-balance sheet entity. Seven years later, ABN Amro had acquired asset-
backed securities worth $28 billion through Amstel Funding Corporation. Approximately 
91% of assets were collateralized debt obligations and the remainder were residential 
mortgages. Credit rating agencies gave AAA rating to 98% of ABN Amro’s assets. However, 
there was little transparency on the quality of assets apart from ratings. ABN Amro issued 
short-term liabilities and offered investors an option to return the assets to ABN Amro. This 
insurance policy worked well for investors as they were protected. However, ABN Amro was 
not protected and it had to bear all the losses during the financial crisis (Acharya and 
Schnabl,2009). 
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The difficulty with stricter disclosure of off-balance sheet vehicles is regulatory dialectic. 
Professor Geoffrey Wood (2008b cited in House of Commons, 2008b) informed the House of 
Commons Treasury Select Committee that banks invented SPVs as an attempt to circumvent 
regulatory requirements. Banks utilise off-balance sheet vehicles to reduce the amount of 
financial capital that they are required to hold under Basel II requirements. The danger of 
stricter regulation in the UK is that banks may shift towards other jurisdictions which enjoy a 
lighter regulatory approach (House of Commons, 2008a). Therefore, national efforts to 
improve off-balance sheet reporting must be coupled with international efforts.  
 
Tackling adverse selection and moral hazard  
The main problems resulting from information asymmetry in securitisation are adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Securitisation has exacerbated the problem of adverse 
selection. Adverse selection takes place when the original lender/seller has more 
information on the borrower’s credit history than the parties in securitisation and so the 
latter cannot differentiate between the quality of products. Under the traditional ‘originate-
to-hold’ model, banks have access to information on the borrower’s credit history, so they 
can pick and choose customers. In the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model however, the transfer 
of ownership from the originator to the SPV means that banks have less incentives to screen 
customers. This encourages originators to take on more bad loans from the beginning under 
the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model because they can pass them along the chain. Adverse 
selection takes place in stages 1, 6 and 7. In the securitisation process, the arranger can 
either securitise high-risk loans or keep the low-risk loans. Arrangers sell the high-risk loans 
to shred risks and create more liquidity. They have little incentive to monitor these loans. 
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Adverse selection also takes place in stage 7, where the opinion of credit rating agencies is 
vulnerable to asymmetric information. Arrangers are more likely to know more about the 
securitised loans than the agencies. 
Recent empirical evidence shows that under the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, loans from 
banks are of a worse quality than those originated by less-regulated institutions (Keys et al, 
2009). Purnanandam (2009) finds that banks with a large quantity of loans originated before 
the first quarter of 2007 (before the credit crunch took place) could not sell them in the 
immediate post-crisis era. He concluded that securitisation contributed to the origination of 
inferior loans. His finding shows that banks with a high gearing ratio and weaker sensitivity 
to demand deposits produce more inferior loans than banks with high capital and stronger 
sensitivity to deposits. Others argue that the proliferation of toxic assets is due to lax 
lending standards. Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) find that the decrease in lending 
standards has led to an increase in the demand of subprime loans. Additionally, the lax 
lending standards are more prevalent in areas where lenders securitised large portions of 
the originated loans. Sir Callum McCarthy (former chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority) informed the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (2008b) that banks 
were also lax in underwriting loans, which is a major contributing factor to the sub-prime 
crisis. These findings are disturbing because the toxic combination of lax lending standards, 
poor underwriting practices and increase of subprime loans contributed to the sub-prime 
crisis (House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008).  
Moral hazard arises when the originator has less incentive to monitor the borrower’s 
actions. A bank’s incentive to monitor borrowers diminishes since ultimate bearer of the risk 
will no longer be the originator, but the investors. Investors such as hedge funds and money 
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market funds do not have the appropriate tools to monitor, as lending is traditionally a 
banking product, and their benchmark risk analysis relies on the bank's historical lending 
records. In the House of Commons Treasury Committee Sixth Report (2008), Mr David Pitt-
Watson expressed the view that originators do not have strong incentives to adequately 
monitor credit risk because finance markets are driven by trading rather than ownership. He 
said that ownership responsibility should be clearly demarcated. Although Berle and Means 
identified that modern day finance is driven by mobility and liquidity, they only considered 
the ownership of shares (and not of risks) in a corporation (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 251). 
In their opinion, shares are liquid, impersonal and shareholders have no responsibility 
because ‘ultimate responsibility and authority are exercised by directors.’ (Berle and Means, 
1932, p. 297) Through securitisation, risks have also become liquid, impersonal and 
originators have little responsibility. Securitisation has allowed originators to shift and pass 
risks along the process, receiving much needed liquidity but losing responsibility and control 
of risks.  
A consequence of the shift in risks is that borrowers in the US can simply walk away from 
their debts if they choose. Traditionally, US borrowers pay off their mortgages first and then 
credit card debts. A report by Experian in 2007 however reveals that borrowers pay off their 
credit card debts before mortgages (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). This is because 
lenders often do not want to foreclose in a depressed property market. Therefore, instead 
of giving loan repayments to the servicer (agent of the SPV), borrowers have bargaining 
powers in relation to mortgage defaults. The remedy is to ask for a significant deposit from 
the borrowers. This would limit their leverage. 
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Moral hazard also takes place in stage 11 of diagram 6. UKFI Limited is a temporary manager 
of taxpayers’ interests in the Royal Bank of Scotland; Lloyds Banking Group; Northern Rock 
and Bradford & Bingley. It has to balance the tasks of maximising value for taxpayers; 
financial stability and maintain healthy competition between banks. UKFI Limited may adapt 
their behaviour due to politics. After all, UKFI Limited is close to the Treasury, despite being 
set up as an independent body. It should avoid pursuing wider policy goals or succumb to 
political pressure. Explicit government backing of the above four banks may reduce the bank 
managers’ incentive to manage risks properly (von Bismarck, Sikken, Steinberg & Wyman, 
2009). UKFI Limited cannot intervene in the daily management of the four banks. Therefore, 
the risks of purchasing bad loans are shifted to taxpayers if UKFI Limited does not monitor 
share prices carefully. For every 10 pence increase in the prices obtained for the shares, 
taxpayers would receive an additional £9 billion from the sale of shares in Royal Bank of 
Scotland and an additional £3 billion from shares in Lloyds Banking Group. On 27 November 
2009, the market prices of Royal Bank of Scotland’s and Lloyds Banking Group’s shares 
implied a loss for the taxpayer of £18 billion (NAO, 2009). Therefore, UKFI Limited should 
monitor share prices and market conditions carefully because short-termism and a quick 
sale would jeopardise shareholders’ value. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are not restricted to the securitisation process. In other 
areas such as insurance, sellers will make representations and warranties about the buyer 
and the underwriting process. Such measures would also apply in the securitisation process, 
on top of thorough due diligence by the buyers. 
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Tackling mortgage fraud and predatory lending 
Stigler and Weiss (1981) showed how information imperfection can lead to banks rationing 
loans to parties they know. By utilising their own information sources, banks provide 
tailored services to customers. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) argue that information 
asymmetry also leads to bank secrecy in lending and the reluctance of secondary markets to 
lend. Banks acquire both negative and positive information about customers from loans. 
They have the upper hand in lending decisions and credit allocation. This has led to 
predatory lending in stages 1-3 of diagram 6 in securitisation.  
Mortgage fraud is another danger in stage 3. This is not a novel concept but Ashcraft and 
Schuermann (2008) assert that mortgage fraud is more common when there is an asset 
bubble. Borrowers want a higher standard of living and are tempted to give inaccurate 
financial details on their loan applications. Moreover, criminals often use property 
transactions as a method to launder ‘dirty’ money. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) argued 
that mortgage fraud played a significant role in the subprime crisis. Fitch Ratings produced a 
report in 2007 which shows that 45 borrowers defaulted very shortly after origination. Fitch 
found that there were fraudulent activities amongst these borrowers such as first-time 
buyers with questionable income and debts; suspicious items on credit history and incorrect 
calculation of debt-to-income ratios. To prevent mortgage fraud, due diligence must be 
conducted thoroughly by both the originator and arranger.  
Tackling managerial slack and risk shifting 
Keller (2008) has identified two main problems with managers of collaterised debt 
obligations. These are managerial slack and risk shifting. Managers work for the ultimate 
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investors by managing a portfolio of 100-200 leveraged loans. Leveraged loans are loans 
that have a high amount of debt and are given to borrowers who are primarily junk-rated 
(Drucker & Puri, 2009). Standard & Poor (2002b) and Fitch (2006) show evidence that 
managers of collaterised debt obligations have a considerable impact on performance. The 
concern is that these managers may not have the incentive to act in the best interests of all 
the investors (Keller, 2008). Keller only considered two classes of tranche investors in his 
analysis: senior tranche (debt) and junior trance (equity). Senior tranche investors are 
entitled to residual profits and so share in the ‘upside risk’. However, they cannot make 
decisions. Keller (2008) commented that it is not clear in whose interests the managers of 
collaterised debt obligations should normally serve. He added that there is a triangular 
principal-agent relationship between the managers and the two types of investors (debt and 
equity). Jensen and Meckling (1976) first identified this relationship. There is a conflict of 
interest here because debt holders generally wish to be risk averse due to the fixed nature 
of their claims. Equity investors however, prefer to pursue riskier ventures because they 
enjoy higher profits and bear few losses from the downside risk. Managerial slack usually 
occurs at the detriment of equity investors. Managers may spend less time screening the 
quality of the loans or monitoring loans because only equity investors will enjoy the profits. 
Further, managers have little to gain from monitoring such loans. This lack of monitoring in 
turn leads to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Keller (2008) suggested that managers can engage in risk shifting in three ways: 
concentrating risk; buying and selling loans below or above par and buying subordinated or 
lower rated loans. In relation to managerial slack, Keller suggested that managers can 
engage in ‘buying the market’ and insufficient credit analysis. The first two methods benefit 
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equity investors because the level of risks in the portfolio is high. The third option increases 
returns for equity investors when economic conditions are good. ‘Buying the market’ and 
insufficient credit analysis are detrimental to both equity and debt investors. This is because 
by buying whatever product is available on the market without proper analysis, the 
managers have the burden of inferior loans whilst not receiving any returns to compensate 
them. Keller concludes by stating that agency problems do matter in the management of 
collaterised debt obligations but it is not certain how effective the traditional solutions such 
as retention of equity tranches and reputational constraints are. Only the markets can 
judge. 
Cummins (2004) gives a more sympathetic view towards collaterised debt obligations. He 
believes that investors’ interests are protected through the various tranches and credit 
enhancement. Originators enhance credit or rating of the securitised instrument by issuing 
collaterals.  The author believes that Keller’s arguments are more compelling in view of the 
evidence given by various credit rating agencies. Excessive leverage led to risk shifting in the 
‘originate-to-distribute’ model. Evidence from diagram 3 below shows that banks in the US, 
Europe and the UK (the UK is not in Eurozone) had excessive leverage ratios and thus risk 
shifting was a natural consequence in many banks. It is hoped that by reducing the leverage 
ratio; originators retaining equity tranches and disclosure of tranches should hopefully 
reduce managerial slack and risk shifting. 
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Diagram 3: Bank Leverage Ratios 
Source: Bank of England (2009) 
[LCFI= Large & Complex Financial Institution] 
 
Tackling conflict of interests and model error 
Ultimate investors have less information than credit rating agencies on the quality of the 
securitised loans, so they rely on credit ratings. However, arrangers pay the credit rating 
agencies. It is akin to the fact that in the UK, sellers of a house pay the estate agent, not the 
buyer. Therefore, there is a conflict of interests in stage 7 because the rating agencies are 
the agents of investors but are paid by the arrangers. Credit ratings agencies have been 
criticised for lack of objectivity. Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) claim that Moodys made 
44% of their revenue in 2007 from securitisation. Securitised deals are more complicated 
than simple corporate deals, so Moodys earn more from the former. However, an 
investigation by the Securities Exchange Commission in July 2008 revealed ‘no evidence that 
decisions about rating methodology or models were based on attracting or losing market 
share.’ (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) thus conclude by 
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stating that credit rating agencies made mistakes, both honest and dishonest. Honest 
mistakes include underestimating the collapse of the housing market and use of limited 
data. These mistakes are arguably due to financial innovation and complexity of financial 
products. Dishonest mistakes were made when credit rating agencies relied too heavily on 
arrangers, therefore they structured deals to maximise most returns for the arrangers. 
Credit rating agencies rely heavily on reputation. Therefore, they should publish their rating 
criteria to improve transparency and public confidence. 
 
Tackling accountability and democratic deficits and liability asymmetry 
Institutional investors and individual investors 
Accountability deficits exist between institutional and individual investors, as well as 
between UKFI Limited and taxpayers. Good corporate governance encourages transparency 
and accountability. Institutional investors now dominate share ownership in the UK. They 
thus have tremendous power in the UK market. Hirschmann (1970) commented that 
institutional investors can exercise their power through a ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ approach. 
Communication to the management is the ‘voice’ approach. Selling shares and leaving the 
market is the ‘exit’ approach. Institutional investors manage vast portfolios on behalf of 
individual shareholders and they often need to hold balanced portfolios. Therefore, ‘exit’ 
may not be a practical solution but it has been the strategy for UK institutional investors for 
centuries. 
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‘Voice’ should be the main channel for institutional investors. UK corporate governance 
reports such as the Cadbury Committee (1992); Greenbury Report (1995); Hampel Report 
(1998) and the Combined Code (2008) all emphasise that institutional investors should 
engage with the investee companies. Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2008) argue that UK 
institutional shareholders are more active than US ones because the UK’s company law is 
more generous with shareholder rights. Institutional shareholders are also more organised 
in the UK and frequently act collectively (Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed that UK institutional investors failed 
to engage with the investee companies and they exited the market when certain share 
prices dropped (Warner, 2009). The relationship between institutional investors and 
investors is similar to the arranger and investor relationship. The institutional investors and 
arrangers (agents of investors) both acted as principals and engaged in trading rather than 
acting on behalf of the investors. This was driven by performance and investment culture in 
the financial industry. Lord Myners commented that this culture has led to hedge funds 
being ‘ownerless corporations’ (Warner, 2009). His biggest attack on institutional investors 
however, is on their passive nature. Institutional investors failed to monitor and challenge 
the boards of the investee companies. Walker (2009) recommended that institutional 
investors should actively engage with individual investors. He thus recommended the 
Stewardship Code on which the Financial Reporting Council is consulting at the moment. 
The Stewardship Code will, in particular, set out the responsibilities of institutional investors 
owed to the individual shareholders. This would hopefully increase accountability. 
UKFI Limited and UK taxpayers 
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As seen in diagram 6, there are three associated issues between the relationship of UKFI 
Limited and UK taxpayers: moral hazard; accountability and democratic deficits. The author 
has discussed moral hazard earlier in the paper. Accountability deficit exists because UKFI 
Limited has given little information on their website. The public knows very little about the 
institution that manages its investments in the four UK banks. Given the fact that UKFI 
Limited holds £23.6 million worth of shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking 
Group (UKFI, 2009), it is important that taxpayers have more information about UKFI 
Limited’s strategy and performance.  
The other issue is democratic deficit, as identified by Peston (2010). In a democratic society, 
taxpayers should have a voice in how society should be run. The government rescued banks 
without consulting the public. Arguably, this was necessary because of the urgency and 
complexity of the matter. However, it was the players in the financial industry who made 
the mistakes and wreaked havoc to the economy. They are now rebuilding the banking 
system through the public’s unconscious delegation. The public elect members of 
parliament to voice their opinions in democratic societies. However, members of parliament 
are not financial or banking experts. Hence, there is a limit as to how much they can help in 
the redesign of the banking system. It is therefore important for academics to engage in 
debates about how the banking system could be improved. 
Individual investors and UK taxpayers 
Liability asymmetry is another issue identified by Peston (2009). Individual investors enjoy 
limited liability whilst UK taxpayers have unlimited liability and thus there is an asymmetry 
problem. This is particularly problematic in banking because banks enjoy explicit and implicit 
32 
 
government support, which encourages excessive risk-taking in banks.  Explicit government 
support includes deposit insurance of up to £50,000 per customer. Implicit support includes 
‘too-big-to-fail’ policy and ‘lender of last resort’. Customers have little incentive to monitor 
banks because their deposits are protected up to £50,000 in the UK. Lacker (2009) is of the 
view that government support actually contributed to the financial crisis. Government 
support distorted incentives; encouraged banks to increase leverage and made the financial 
system unstable. Withdrawal of government guarantees would be very difficult because 
customers would lack confidence in the banking system; bank runs would make an economy 
very vulnerable and systemic risks would spread quickly within the banking system. Much 
support has been given to the Tobin tax, a tax on financial transactions to stop speculative 
trading on currency exchange. The tax would be a way of building up a bank’s reserve to 
absorb future losses. Hence, the costs of bank failures will be absorbed by banks, not 
taxpayers. The Tobin tax appeals because banks should bear the consequences of financial 
losses. International co-operation however, is needed for the successful implementation of 
the tax. 
5. Conclusion 
Securitisation has played a dominant role in global modern banking since the 1980s. 
Financial innovation is beneficial to society if the financial products and systems are safe 
and reliable. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed several inter-connected 
weaknesses that financial innovation has created: multiple principal-agent problems; 
information asymmetry; adverse selection; moral hazard; mortgage fraud; predatory 
lending; model error with credit rating agencies; managerial slack and risk shifting. 
Information asymmetry is an acute problem in securitisation and it exists in all the stages of 
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the securitisation process. Multiple principal-agent problems have created misalignment of 
incentives between parties; excessive leverage and risk-taking which contributed to the 
financial crisis. Poor risk management by originators and arrangers have led to bad loans 
being retained on their balance sheets.  
Better disclosure by increasing transparency is essential to reduce principal-agent problems. 
Most innovative financial products and processes are protected by trade secrecy (Lerner, 
2002). Hedge funds have to protect their clients’ confidentiality. Further, secrecy is required 
to protect the franchise value in investment strategies. Yet, it is due to this secretive 
environment that principal-agent problems foster. It is only through disclosure and better 
understanding of the complex financial products that the principal-agent problems can be 
minimised. Lo (2009) suggested that hedge funds should publish their strategies 
anonymously. This has the double benefit of revealing information to players in 
securitisation as well as protecting hedge funds through anonymity. The author believes 
that this is a good solution and should be encouraged. Another possible solution is to 
encourage financial institutions to file for patents to protect their financial products rather 
than rely on trade secrecy. Since the Federal Circuit’s decision of State Street Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 23, 1998), it is possible for 
financial products to be patented. By patenting the financial products, the patent owners 
will have a monopoly for 20 years from the date when the application is filed. This should 
increase incentives and rewards for patent owners. It improves transparency because 
patent applications contain information about the financial products. It should also 
encourage competition because the patent owners can grant licences to competitors. 
Although licencees are restricted in what they can do, they will be motivated to produce 
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similar products in order to compete in the market. Naturally, there is always the threat of 
infringement action but overall, the author believes that patents would increase incentives, 
increase transparency and improve consumer protection. 
Other methods of reducing the principal-agent problems include retention of equity 
tranches and monitoring the long-term performance of loans; better regulation of off-
balance sheet vehicles and better risk management are some recommendations that the 
author proposes to restore the frail banking system.  
A robust banking system is necessary for economic growth. Societies need banks to provide 
credit and to prosper, especially in capitalist societies. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has 
revealed that taxpayers have borne the costs of bank rescues, a highly unjust burden to 
society. Capitalism must be restored to the banking sector in the sense the bankers (and not 
the public) should pay for their mistakes. A wider stakeholder approach should be adopted 
in banking, especially when UK taxpayers now own four banks. Academics, banking 
practitioners and regulators should actively engage in debates and discussions to redesign 
the banking structure because of democratic deficit and liability asymmetry. 
Severe financial crises are described as black swan events. ‘Black swan events’ are extremely 
rare events. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is arguably the worst crisis since the Great 
Depression in the early 1930s and has had a major impact on the global economy. However, 
Mandelbrot, the father of fractal theory and a pioneer in the study of market swings, argues 
that finance is prone to a ‘wild’ randomness, which is rare in nature. He said that in markets, 
‘rare big changes can be more significant than the sum of many small changes’ (Mandelbrot, 
cited in Valencia, 2010). We must therefore grasp this opportunity and actively learn from 
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this financial crisis to minimise the impact of the next one. If the above recommendations 
are not implemented, the seeds for the next financial crisis are already sown.   
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